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The opposition between knowledge and non-knowledge tends to obscure the 
very fact that digitization has also "remedied" knowledge lending it the 
character of a commodity instead of a norm (as it used to be previously 
considered, despite the disagreement philosophers and epistemologists could 
entertain among themselves). Hence, one is required not only to situate non-
knowledge vis-à-vis knowledge but also knowledge vis-à-vis digitization. We 
do so by shifting the interrogation from an epistemic perspective to an 
ontological one.  




Although we have no word for it, establishing an 
appropriate degree of “middle connectivity” to 
the world is such a basic feature of the human 
condition that doing it successfully has been 
lifted into the rarefied reaches of sainthood and 
enlightenment; failing to accomplish it, identified 
as a cause of paralytic anxiety.  
Brian Cantwell Smith 
The relationship between knowledge, non-knowledge and digitality is a complex one still 
waiting to be fully explored. As evidenced in this volume, efforts to shed some light on "non-
knowledge" open up new directions of research especially relevant as we'll see in a world that's 
becoming everyday more digitized. On the other hand, as such the opposition between 
knowledge and non-knowledge tends to obscure the very fact that digitization has also 
"remedied" knowledge lending it the character of a commodity instead of a norm (as it used to 
be previously considered, despite the disagreement philosophers and epistemologists could 
entertain among themselves). Hence, one is required not only to situate non-knowledge vis-à-vis 
knowledge but also knowledge vis-à-vis digitization. Such will be our attempt in this paper. 
Knowledge, digitality and unknowledge 
Knowledge and digitality: epistemic issues 
Knowledge both admits of a vast number of characterizations and comes in different flavors. 
While it is possible to hold shared views on the purview of knowledge while disagreeing at the 
same time on its exact definition disagreement may still loom on the horizon. Whether tacit or 
practical knowledge for instance refer to a phenomenon that can be subsumed under one 
Heading along with scientific knowledge or knowledge as traditionally conceived by 
epistemologists is a question that remains largely open to debate. 
For that reason, at first glance it would seem pretty much illusory to contrast a unified concept 
of knowledge to non-knowledge. Yet, without such a unified concept, the opposition seemingly 
becomes moot at best. This is where digitization comes in. Digitization and knowledge entertain 
a complex and very paradoxical relationship. Going back to the concept "knowledge 
economy"1, made possible by the advances of digitization, one immediately sees this relation for 
what it is: a relation of commodification. "Knowledge", in "knowledge economy", no longer 
denotes to any norm or domain of knowledge (which it merely connotes) but rather betokens a 
broad assimilation to a commodity essentially cultivated in order to sustain growth. Both the 
normative and pluralistic aspects have thence simply vanished.  
While paradoxical this evolution shouldn't come as a surprise for it may very well characterize 
digitization as such. As a consequence, our claim in this paper will be that digitality has both 
overplayed and downplayed salient aspects of knowledge to the point that we might on initial 
approximation think of this evolution as bringing knowledge nearer to non-knowledge (as we 
shall see however, as we progressively move away from epistemic questions the drive to 
introduce an additional category will be more and more compelling). 
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Overplayed since models and abstractions have become non only a sign of the portability of 
conceptual knowledge but a way to perform assemblages that induce new realities instead of 
defering one way or another to an existing world (let's not be mistaken: deferring to the world 
includes taking into account the way it is transformed by our own activity - especially at the 
time of the Anthropocene). Google's PageRank algorithm is a good example of that since it 
construes incoming "links" as votes (never votes of defiance!) in its willingness to redefine the 
Web by using measures of authority, pretending to remain neutral whereas its own presence 
modifies the very topology of the thing it was supposed to independently measure.  
Downplayed since the commodification of knowledge, made possible due to the lack of regards 
towards the traditional norms of knowledge (in a sense "anything goes" in the knowledge 
economy as long as its goals are achieved), resulted in more and more data, metadata, 
documents, and so on and so forth - what we'd call "knowledge traces" - being produced and 
made available with unforeseen consequences well-worth examining.  
Innovation is better served or so it seems by people who have little regard to the nooks and 
crannies of everyday life, assured as they are of the well-foundedness of their mission to 
transform it. Of course, why on earth transform that which is not fully apprehended and make 
sure it is replaced (or modified) by something genuinely new and relevant? The answer to the 
second objection is only induction through enumeration should provide an answer and it it well-
known to be insufficient. Let's just put it aside basically because we have to live with similar 
"uncertainties". The answer to the first objection is much less straightforward. Digital 
technologies produce new assemblages while at the same time claiming to operationalize 
preexisting realities (intelligence, authority, vote, trust, etc.). Changing the meaning of those 
concept is not an explicit goal, rather such realities are taken for granted and whether or not the 
ensuing operationalization and these new assemblages turns them into something wholly 
different, even in logical contradiction to what they previously stood for, is no one's business. 
Assemblages and performation have always marched hand in hand since assemblages do by 
definition perform a specific effect2. Whence the legitimate fear that focusing on assemblages 
and their performances might obfuscate any reference (and deference) to the world. But here it 
is rather the lack of care displayed by innovators which is misleading, leading to abstain from 
paying attention to the nooks and crannies of the assemblages produced (the results of the 
aforementioned operationalization). We thus go from "unknowledge" to "unknowledge" - here 
we introduce this concept in order to characterize a specific contrast to knowledge akin to a lack 
of willingness to defer to the world still unabashedly regarded as full-fledged knowledge.  
Unknowledge is very well illustrated by this quote from Phil Agre about AI:  
As a practical matter, the purpose of AI is to build computer systems whose operation 
can be narrated using intentional vocabulary. Innovations frequently involve techniques 
that bring new vocabulary into the field: reasoning, planning, learning, choosing, 
strategizing, and so on. Whether the resulting systems are really exhibiting these 
qualities is hard to say, and AI people generally treat the question as an annoying 
irrelevance. What matters practically is not the vague issue of what the words "really 
mean" but the seemingly precise issue of how they can be defined in formal terms that 
permit suitably narratable systems to be designed. If you disapprove of the way that we 
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formalize the concept of reasoning or planning or learning, they are likely to say, then 
you are welcome to invent another way to formalize it (Agre 1997)."3 
Non-knowledge and unknowledge: an ontological characterization 
Let's go back to non-knowledge. With unknowledge in sight, what can we now say about non-
knowledge? We here follow Brian Cantwell Smith who contends that content, a technical term 
in analytic philosophy used to designate the basis of knowledge and action, can be either 
conceptual or non-conceptual. Conceptual content involves positing a world consisting of 
objects, properties and relation which amounts to carving reality into discretized individuals 
(seen as the bearers of properties and in relations with one another). Non-conceptual content, 
while still representational, doesn't register the world likewise but rather in terms of 
unindividuated "features" that precedes the advent or objects or individuals – which, for Smith, 
is essentially an ethical matter (a matter of "mattering" as he puts it). The picture offered by 
non-conceptual content is essentially a “subobjective”4 one. Whereas non-conceptual content 
depicts the world in overwhelming details, fit for situated and local encounters, conceptual 
content and objectivity in general strip those same details so as to make it possible to refer over 
a long distance (to things long gone and buried in the past, not yet born in a distant future, or too 
shrouded in vagueness to do otherwise)5.   
With objects and ontology predicated on ethics, what remains metaphysically essential is to give 
room to reference making. That is, to articulate the causally effective local encounters with the 
world with non-causal long-distance reference. In other words, what is valued here is less one 
overarching metaphysical category (the One, the transcendental a priori, ideas, the body, and so 
on and so forth.) than enough room to fit local proximal connections and distal reference:   
it is essential (...) and also an anchor of common sense, that the multi-various parts of 
the world do not march in lockstep together. The world is fundamentally characterized 
by an underlying flex or slop - a kind of slack or "play" that allows some bits to move 
about or adjust without much influencing, and without being much influenced by, other 
bits. (...) The world's flex and slop is so obvious that it is a little hard to talk about. As a 
contrast, therefore, imagine a world quite unlike ours, consisting, as suggested of 
nothing but an endless series of interlocked gears. Suppose, to make this precise, that 
every gear is constructed so as to mesh with one or more immediate neighbors, and that 
the entire gear universe is interconnected, but in such a way that it is still possible for 
them all to be turned (...) so that it does not lock up. Suppose, too, that the gears are 
perfect: no friction, no play between the teeth, and shaped so that rotating one at an 
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even speed causes the others to rotate evenly as well, though at a potentially different 
speed. The gear world would lack slop. Effects would not dissipate. If one gear were to 
move by even a tiny amount, every other gear in the universe, no matter how far flung, 
would instantly and proportionally be affected." (...) If the flex were too little (...) the 
world would lock up like the gear world, and everything would be correlated with 
everything else. Such a world would be too rigid, too straight, too stuffy intentionality 
would be neither possible nor necessary. If the flex were too great, on the other hand, it 
would have the opposite problem: things would be too loose, everything would be 
random, and effect-transcending coordination would be impossible. Imagine (...) an 
infinite space randomly occupied by an indefinitely large number of particles, all of 
which drift aimlessly around, none of which ever interact (Cantwell Smith 1998, p. 199-
200).6 
At first glance, unknowledge appears to threaten long-distance reference since according to the 
definition we adopted it no longer defers to the world preoccupied as it is by its own self-
centered efficiency. But such a criticism would be mistaken if left at that. While unknowledge 
denotes a peculiar lack of knowledge it is also defined by what is produces: namely, 
"knowledge traces". In other words, it adds gears where there were none, where space gave 
enough room to the "world's flex and slop", filling in preexisting gaps with no special care for 
long distance reference, favoring the multiplication of interlocked gears and short-distance 
communication to simulate continuity over long distance reference. The strategy adopted is 
rather one of generalized padding where gears can be endlessly introduced and correlated with 
one another. Therefore, both unknowledge and non-knowledge also raise ontological - rather 
than purely epistemic - issues of absence and presence, distance and proximity. 
Non-knowledge and (un)knowledge  
We will address the way these ontological issues manifest themselves by looking at the 
followings examples, all three drawn from digital cultures and technologies.  
The Internet of Things 
The Internet of Things (IoT) stands as one of the main promises of digital innovation for the 
coming years. Out of the numerous features of IoT is the possibility to interact with concrete 
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6 
physical objects out there in the "real-world". The perspective to go "beyond" the screen and to 
re-territorialize computation is a very powerful and appealing one indeed. At long last 
computation shall escape the realm of the "virtual" and reach out to concrete objects. Or such 
goes the saying.  
What is fascinating with the IoT is how much of a thorough attempt to circumvent the 
boundaries of objects through technical means it proves to be. One may wonder whether it is 
sufficient to attach an apparatus to a patch of reality in order to reality get a good grip on its 
identity conditions. Probably not. But maybe this is beside the point. At least attaching and 
RFID chip or any other prop will make it possible to localize the object, potentially throughout 
time, even allowing to grasp it less through deictic encounter - this object here and now - and 
rather in an abstract way as a space-time arrow, something we can barely conceive of, less so 
encounter directly.  
Remember though, abstraction is no part of the sales pitch for connected objects but rather their 
concreteness, proximity and availability through direct encounter. While we may still conceive 
of objects as abstractions what connected objects continuously produce are ever more traces, 
making it possible not to refer in a non-causal way but rather to reach out in a causal way by 
artifactualizing the path to the object, adding enough gears to fill in the gap between agent and 
objet (or between objects) to make that happen.  
Eventually, there precisely lies the paradox behind the whole enterprise. The boundaries of 
connected objects are defined and "maintained" through technology and the active production of 
knowledge-traces. While discussing the importance of "boundary-maintaining7 Donna Haraway 
quotes Brian Cantwell Smith in support of her argument: "You have to stop being what you 
were when you start paying attention to the work it takes to maintain your clear distinctions". 
That perfectly sums up the situation we found ourselves in: just as devices are introduced that 
should help to circumscribe as precisely as possible the boundaries of objects (allowing for 
direct interaction and localization over time), the latter nevertheless expand in unprecedented 
ways.  
Just ask yourself "what exactly are the boundaries of a connected object?". "It is truly wholly 
present as I interact with it?" The answer is no, of course, and not only that but being wholly 
present would simply defeat the very purpose of the IoT. Connected objects as their very name 
betokens communicate with servers on the cloud and/or other objects in their vicinity 
(sometimes even using Blockchains - public inviolable ledgers!). They also display behavior 
dictated by the algorithms using for the programming, sometimes going as far as betraying their 
original purpose as exampled in the recent Volswagen scandal. For all these reasons, not only 
are the boundaries not maintained or even expanded - they literally shatter!  
In a nutshell, the IoT is an attempt to substitute digital devices for abstractions and place upon 
their shoulders the onus of providing identity conditions to objects. The morals of the story ends 
up being an ontological one: it is not possible to replace abstraction, causally ineffective 
reference making, distance and absence with actual technical devices, causally effective 
localization, proximity and presence. Or expect paradoxes like the one we've just encountered.  
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Love and felicity 
The second example has been studies by Eva Illouz8 in her inquiry on love and the new digital 
life that shapes our most intimate relationships. Illouz' diagnosis romantic encounter become 
increasingly saturated by knowledge practices - that thanks to the generalization of online 
profiles, and the metadata they contain, knowledge play a role that has gone awry, obliterating, 
as she puts it, other types of knowledge and reshuffling the boundaries between proximity and 
distance (an ontological feat of no little consequences as we've seen), among other things. 
Nowhere else is the subtle dialectic between absence and presence, distance and proximity, 
more at play than in the phenomenon called "love". It is not surprising then that unbalancing 
this relation with knowledge (even under the guise of unknowledge) should put it at risk. Before 
intimacy grew to become a norm we never knew that much about our love interests. 
Additionally, before the advent of digital cultures, social networks, online profiles and the likes, 
we never knew that much about our potential love interests ahead of encountering them.  
In the wake of what we said about the IoT, we might want to assess that the boundaries 
personhood in a relationship have by and large been displaced. While profiles do seem to 
provide accurate (if coarse) knowledge, making visible "who" we are by maintaining the 
boundaries of our identity, in fact what happens is that they delegate (outsource, really) what 
was previously left to chance and hazardous encounters to algorithms that calculate our best 
match.  
Of course, pretending that love owes nothing to chance is not entirely new. Sociology, for one, 
is the discipline that literally saw as its mission (as opposed to novel writing for instance) to 
shed light on the social dynamics underneath the most intimate and private phenomena, 
including lovers felt attraction. It held dear and strived to uncover the unseen determinants at 
play behind the curtain. And it was correct in his own right of course. There's no denying that 
love might not escapes determinism.  
Yet, we should nonetheless pay heed to a paramount difference between these two cases. While 
sociologists did provide statistical conclusions in favor of their claims, no one ever (mis)took 
them as spiritual advisers. In a sense, so much so has happened with the advent of social 
networks and dating websites. Filling in innumerable fields on a daily basis means people 
become both providers and consumers of the (un)knowledge thus produced. Whereas 
sociologists' take on love used to be discussed mainly among peers or the educated readership 
with an interest in the discipline it may be said to have now infused many if not most of our 
daily transactions. 
Then again, such a move might be readily welcomed. Aren't relationships, now that we can 
mimic the behaviors and functional possibilities of connected objects (especially the localization 
bit and the availability of "leaky" knowledge traces), all the better for that? After all, no talk 
about the identity conditions of objects will likely dispel the belief that cheating is cheating and 
that mobiles phones (undoubtedly the IoT's first citizen) do provide an efficient way to learn the 
truth. Must we eventually backtrack on the idea of unknowledge if deferring to the world 
(apparently) means deferring to such simple truths? 
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The point rather is that deferring to the world might precisely mean something else, at least as 
far as love is concerned. In (Latour 2012), Bruno Latour suggests that we adopt a pluralistic 
view on metaphysics so as to give space to phenomena that are amenable each to specific 
felicity or infelicity conditions. Going back to Agre's remark, we may begin to understand why 
digitality is by no means harmless. Digital tools do promise transparency. It is all too easy then 
to treat love as demanding it. Paying attention to the felicity conditions of love should however 
advice otherwise. Indeed, the latter may lie less in the search for truth (or knowledge) than in 
love's own subsistence; a matter of delicate, finespun, dialectic between proximity and distance, 
presence and absence, knowledge and non-knowledge, put at risk when (un)knowledge takes 
over in its “profusing transparency” (talk of “transparency” bears witness to an interesting 
choice of words as the immediate danger is either to be blinded by the abundance of digital 
traces of all kinds or to treat them indeed as transparent intermediaries). However, in order to 
properly understand the key role played by non-knowledge with regards to love one has to 
overcome unknowledge first. 
Art: caring for the artists 
Let us dig further by taking one final example that will hopefully prolong the previous 
discussion. 
Since 2014 I have had the luck and opportunity to work as the architect of the digital platform 
of Lafayette Anticipation 9 , the Galeries Lafayette's foundation for contemporary art. The 
challenge was (and remains) to foster interest in contemporary art beyond the small circles of 
aficionados (be them critics or patrons). Contemporary art notoriously challenges the logic of 
the exhibition and as a symbol of the excesses of capitalistic markets is subject to criticism from 
both the general public and intellectuals. The aim of the project soon became to dispense 
knowledge about contemporary creative process, loaded as it is with uncertainties, so as to share 
an understanding of art in the making, a risky process that generates its own criteria of 
judgement (far from presupposing that is should always be successful). 
That is how the idea emerged of developing an archive that would centralize both data and 
documents (traces, really) generated by the foundation's various members in their daily 
activities, from the treasurer to the head of production. Pioneering laboratory studies published 
in the 80's have completely modified our understanding of the scientific process by insisting on 
the hidden contribution of a great many actors previously left in the dark by epistemologists. 
The fulcrum of their description underscored the importance of practice, distributed action and 
hidden (dirty) work. Shifting the narrative from geniuses inhabiting ivory towers to a more 
realistic depiction of science did upset some scientists although in fairness deconstructing the 
robustness of scientific results had never been on the agenda of the ethnographers who produced 
these descriptions.  
Neither is it our intention to ultimately “deconstruct” the figure of the artist or the work of art. 
The ideas behind the platform were thereupon discussed at a very early stage of development in 
the summer 2015, in Paris, during a two days session involving about 40 artists, designers, 
architects, critics, philosophers and curators10. Reactions among the artists were mixed, some 
expressing fears that unveiling their "secrets" of creations would be tantamount to yielding to a 
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broader demand for transparency and mimic the extractivist logic exhibited by the likes of 
Google or Facebook.  
Even though scientists admittedly found no significant hindrance in ethnographers work, artists 
had every right to express their fears. And for the exact same reason mentioned above in the 
preceding section: transparency shouldn't put artists at risk. The goal of the foundation had 
always been to assist them and cater to their (or their work's) needs.  
The willingness to open a new window on the artist labor did not entail a primacy of 
transparency over creation. Not unlike love, art has its own conditions of felicity. Subsistence, 
then may adequately translate into being able to listen to the call of the work of art (to speak 
Etienne Souriau's language11). And that might imply to obfuscate part of the creative process if 
needs be. Immediately comes the question “does it amount to lying?”. Whenever truth is 
equated with transparency, with little to no regards to the phenomenon at stake, the answer is 
yes. By contrast, when subsistence, understood as the continuation of the phenomenon at stake, 
takes priority, the answer shall be a clear "no", knowledge then being subservient to care. Going 
back to the ethnography, this is reminiscent of "ethnographic refusal", a decision not to write 
about a subject matter to avoid putting it at risk, being exploitive or unhelpful (among the many 
traps that await researchers)12. 
Latour himself expresses the need for a “crooked language” in politics: 
nothing is more important for this inquiry than to find the difference between truth and 
falsity in politics. If there is one area where our inheritance has to be revisited, it is 
surely that of the hopes placed in politics and its capacity for extension. What will we 
have to do to situate appropriately crooked speaking once again at the center of our 
civility as the only means to collect the collective, and above all to universalize it? Does 
the Circle give us a thread like Ariadne’s that will let us speak here again of the rational 
and the irrational but in a well-curved way, that is, in its own language, provided that 
we don’t seek to judge it with the help of a different touchstone? We need this thread, 
for how could we stand up straight on the agora, with no hope of help from any Science 
and yet without giving up on reason, about controversial issues that have taken on the 
dimensions of the planet and in the heat of a crowd that now numbers in the billions? 
(Latour 2012)13 
Contrary to Latour, we would not restrict such a crooked language to politics. Or rather, to put it 
more adequately, this kind of language can be seen as the political answer provided to a broader 
issue. Throughout the discussion of the last three examples we have come to give precedence to 
subsistence over truth with respect to non-knowledge 14 . Subsistence requires care 15  and a 
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hospitable middle-ground, whether in politics, love or the arts. Unknowledge, by contrast, 
unable as it is to defer to the world even as it conveys trite truths, striving to unbalance the 
middle-ground, sorely lacks this aspect. As Phil Agre puts it, “a reformed technical practice 
[should] employ the tools of critical inquiry to engage in a richer and more animated 
conversation with the world”16. For this conversation with the world to be genuinely fruitful 
non-knowledge shall not be overlooked.   
Conclusion  
The aforementioned crooked language is no enemy of reason yet neither is it to be understood in 
term of truth or falsity as science does. As we have seen, non-knowledge unlike knowledge (and 
to a lesser extent unknowledge, which not only is a degraded norm but also has an ontological 
dimension) is less of an epistemic value than an ontological middle ground allowing for the 
subsistence of a multiplicity of generic phenomena according to their own requirements (much 
akin to Latour's modes of existence). William James himself noted that "the same thing (...) can 
belong to many systems, as when a man is connected with other objects by heat, by gravitation, 
by love, and by knowledge [my emphasis]17.” Tellingly, knowledge in his enumeration was but 
one among many such systems. James also noticed our relentless propensity to add what he 
called new “systems of concatenation”: “We ourselves are constantly adding to the connection 
of things, organizing labor-unions, establishing postal consular, mercantile, railroad, telegraphs, 
colonial, and other systems that bind us and things together in ever wider reticulations.”18 It is 
somewhat ironic that we only have a negative expression like "non-knowledge" at our disposal 
to refer to the multiplicity of these systems of concatenations minus one... Such is, today, the 
overwhelming weight of unknowledge: no longer a norm but rather a system of concatenations 
that not only overshadows and twists others but eventually jeopardizes their conditions of 
subsistence. 
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